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But since pre-existing equitable interests of this type would remain subject to
the controls involved in their specific enforcement, though they might outlast
the statutory limit, they would not do so if courts of equity deemed their en-
forcement inequitable.
Section 643 appears to be a sound realization of the limitations of legislation
dealing with possibilities of reverter and rights of entry. Certainly the use of
these instruments in the enforcement of leasehold promises does not produce
the grossly inequitable results caused by their use in grants of fees. Nor need
such legislation deal with the highly developed law of mortgages, where the
safeguards devised to protect mortgagors and the security nature of the trans-
action render the problems greatly different from those involved in the Illinois
proposal."4
THE LIQUIDATION OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
INTERESTS-A FEDERAL TAX PROBLEM
Tax problems raised for shareholders concerned with liquidating their entire
interests in a corporate enterprise have been complicated by failure of Congress
and the courts to recognize the existence of a distinct, identifiable business deci-
sion which requires consistent treatment regardless of the particular method
employed to accomplish disinvestment, of the capital used in the business.
Basically, three alternative methods of disposal are available to the sellers of a
corporate business. The conventional method of disinvestment is a statutory
proceeding in liquidation and dissolution by which the corporation, usually
through trustees, sells its assets and then distributes the proceeds to its share-
43 "Section 6. This Act does not invalidate or affect (3) a conveyance made for the purpose
of releasing or extinguishing a possibility of reverter or right of entry or re-entry:
(2) A right of entry or the transfer of a right of entry for default in payment of rent re-
served in a lease or for breach of covenant contained in a lease, where such transfer is in con-
nection with a transfer of a reversion and the rent reserved in the lease.
(3) A right of entry or the transfer of a right of entry for default in payment of a rent granted
or reserved in any deed or grant, or for breach of any covenant in any deed or grant where a
rent is granted or reserved, where such transfer is in connection with a transfer of a rent so
granted or of a rent so reserved; or
(4) Any rights of a mortgagee based upon the terms of the mortgage, or any right of a Trus-
tee or a beneficiary under a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage based upon the terms of the
trustless deed."
44 The proposed Illinois statute concludes with a separability clause that does not re-
quire comment.
"Section 7. If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision thereto to any
property, person, or circumstances is held to be invalid, such provision as to such property,
person or circumstances shall be deemed to be excised from this Act, and the invalidity thereof
as to such property, person, or circumstances shall not affect any of the other provisions of this
Act or the application of such provision to property, persons or circumstances Other than those
as to which it is invalid, and this Act shall be applied and shall be effective in every situation
so far as its constitutionality extends."
x The word "disinvestment" is used to mean a conversion of assets to liquid form or, as it
is sometimes expressed, a negative investment.
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holders.2 A second method involves a direct transfer of the outstanding shares
from shareholders to purchasers without a disturbance of the corporate entity.3
The third is a liquidation in kind to the shareholders, who may then sell the
assets individually.4
Regardless of the manner of disposition, a shareholder is taxed upon a capital
gain measured by the value of that part of the distribution or sale price received
by him which exceeds the basis for his shares.5 When the disinvestment proceeds
through trustees for a corporation there may also be a capital gains tax levied
upon the company.6 This procedure of statutory liquidation through trustees
results in a double tax, once to the company, then to the shareholder.7 On the
other hand, a double tax may be avoided by a transfer of the shares, since under
this procedure no gain is attributable to the corporation although the share-
holder is assessed upon his realized gain.8
This difference in treatment of statutory liquidation and disinvesting by a
sale of shares may explain the uncertainty regarding the tax consequences of the
third form of disinvestment-liquidation in kind. The Treasury Regulations
provide that a corporation derives no taxable gain upon a liquidation in kind to
its shareholders. 9 This provision of the regulations for a single tax resembles the
single-tax treatment of the sale-of-shares device. Little confusion would arise
if the liquidation in kind were always recognized as a single-tax procedure.
But despite the Treasury Regulations, some courts seem to regard the single-tax
2 "Gross Income of Corporation in Liquidation.-When a corporation is dissolved, its
affairs are usually wound up by a receiver or trustees in dissolution. The corporate existence
is continued for the purpose of liquidating the assets and paying the debts, and such receiver or
trustees stand in the stead of the corporation for such purposes." Treas. Reg. iiI, § 29.22(a)-2o
(i943).
3 x9 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § go65 (1933).
4 Ballantine, Corporations § 319 (2d ed. 1946).
5 Property received by a shareholder in a liquidation is treated as payment in exchange for
the stock held by the shareholder. Tax consequences of the transaction, as far as the share-
holder is concerned, are identical with those in a sale or exchange of stock not connected with a
liquidation situation. Internal Revenue Code, § ii5(c), 56 Stat. 841 (1942), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ ii5(c) (i945); Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.115(c) (i943).
6Internal Revenue Code, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9 (I939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a) (194o); Treas.
Reg. III, § 29.22(a)-20 (1943).
7The diminution of a shareholder's receipts upon liquidation and sale caused by the pay-
ment of a tax upon gain assessed against the corporation will prevent an actual assessment
against the shareholders personally when, by virtue of such diminution, these receipts fall below
the shareholder's basis for the shares. However, even in the situation where the shareholder
does not pay any tax, the double tax is no less real. Individual receipts are decreased by ioo
per cent of the tax paid by the corporation. Were the amount of that tax paid to the individual
shareholder, a tax levied upon him would take only a fraction of the additional sum received.
9 No cases have been found which disregard the corporate entity in the sale-of-shares
situation in order to find a taxable gain to the vendor corporation.
9 "No gain or loss is realized by a corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in
kind in partial or complete liquidation, however they may have appreciated or depreciated in
value since their acquisition." Treas. Reg. III, § 29.22(a)-20 (1943).
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feature of liquidations in kind as an avoidance of the double tax incurred in a
statutory liquidation.o As a consequence, a liquidation in kind may result in
either a single or a double tax depending upon the suspicions of the court regard-
ing the circumstances surrounding the liquidation.
In the only Supreme Court decision bearing directly on the problem, the
taxpayer attempted to utilize the regulations concerning liquidations in kind in
order to avoid the payment of a double tax. The decision introduced a sub-
stantial obstacle to the employment of the liquidation-in-kind device.
In Con'r of Int. Rev. v. Court Holding Co.,-I the taxpayer corporation with-
drew from an oral agreement to sell an apartment building, its only asset, after
discovering that such a sale by the company would entail heavy income taxes.
Then the corporation distributed the property in complete liquidation to its
two sole shareholders, who sold to the same purchaser on terms identical with
those of the earlier oral agreement. The Supreme Court found that the corpora-
tion incurred tax liability on the resulting gain,12 stating that "To permit the
true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist
solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration
of the tax policies of Congress."'3
The concern of the court with "formalism" seems to have been prompted by
a belief that the taxpayer was seeking an unwarranted avoidance of taxes
through the use of a technical device. But the procedure adopted by the share-
holders, liquidation in kind, is permissible under the Internal Revenue Code.4
The view that tax considerations should be merely collateral to the liquidation
seems unrealistic. The hiring of tax attorneys and consultants is surely common-
,O Despite the single-tax treatment provided in the Treasury Regulations for liquidations
in kind, the courts have displayed a readiness to impose a double tax, particularly in the case
of closely-held corporations, apparently on the theory that the liquidation in kind was merely
a legalistic cover-up for a statutory liquidation. This attitude may be explained by the cumula-
tion of tax advantages available in liquidation situations. The capital gains provisions of
Section x17 of the Internal Revenue Code, in general, enable shareholders to realize a 75 per
cent net gain on liquidation, although since these advantages are today available to both indi-
viduals and corporations, they do not represent tax-avoidance in this situation. In addition,
the re-allocation of income from a single corporation to several shareholders creates tax sav-
ings under a system of progressive income tax rates. Finally, the avoidance of a double tax
results in further substantial savings. The decisions, however, have not made these considera-
tions explicit but have, instead, emphasized the necessity of determining whether the cor-
poration or the shareholder was the party actually making the sale of the assets.
These situations should be clearly distinguished from the Hollywood "collapsible" corpora-
tion type of case where the taxpayer is attempting to treat the receipt of ordinary income as
a capital gain. Use of the corporation as a means of converting ordinary income to capital
gain has been the subject of comment. 48 Time, No. 6, at go (Aug. 5, 1946).
" 324 U.S. 331 (i945).
12 The opinion creates the impression that the court thought it was exposing a well camou-
flaged tax-avoidance scheme. The court observed that $i,ooo received by the corporation
from the purchaser prior to'the liquidation was applied to the purchase price. It is possible,
however, that the "crudeness" of the taxpayer's liquidation technique was a result of complete
candor on the part of his counsel who apparently had no doubt as to its legality.
1324 U.S. 33r, 334 (I945). '4 Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.22(a)-2o (1943).
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place, and businessmen often quite legitimately choose between alternative
methods of dealing solely on the basis of varying tax consequences.' s In addi-
tion, the requirement that a taxpayer in order to secure the benefits of liquida-
tion in kind must refrain from negotiating prior to liquidation, may pose a dif-
ficult problem of evidence relating to the existence of prior negotiations with a
purchaser. 6
The Court Holding Co. decision seems to require that shareholders, if they
wish to avoid a double tax, must effectuate a liquidation in kind before in-
stituting negotiations with outsiders for the sale of the assets. At the least, it
requires that shareholders conduct the entire course of negotiation in their own
names.
This requirement that shareholders must effectuate a liquidation in kind
before instituting negotiations for the sale of an asset will subject shareholders
to a capital gains tax before there has been an actual "realization" of gain in
cash.17 Therefore, the shareholders must bear the risk of a depreciation in the
value of the assets during the interval between the liquidation and the sale to
others. In addition, if shareholders are denied the advantages of negotiations
precedent to the liquidation, they face a possibility of retaining assets for which
there is no ready market.
Consideration of the element of risk suggests a possible rationale of the Court
Holding Co. case. A shareholder may be required to assume some personal risk
before he can avoid the impact of a double tax. Where the shareholder does not
bear any risk, the court for tax purposes may assume that the corporation is
still a party to the sale transaction. 8
A recent case involving a parent-subsidiary liquidation, Fairfield S. S. Corp.
v. Com'r of Int. Rev. 9 does not, however, follow a risk interpretation of the
Court Holding Co. decision. In the Fairfield case, the three shareholders of a
parent corporation decided to liquidate that company and the Fairfield Com-
pany, a wholly-owned subsidiary. Prior to formal liquidation the conttolling
shareholder hired an agent and a broker to receive offers for the subsidiary's
principal asset, a ship. All parties to the negotiations understood that the asset
was to be sold in the name of the parent company. A revocable offer to purchase
"5See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); United States v. Isham, I7 Wall.
(U.S.) 496, 5o6 (1873); Chisholm v. Com'r. of Int. Rev., 79 F. 2d 14, 15 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935).
,6 The burden of proving that prior negotiations did not occur is placed upon the taxpayer.
Wichita Terminal Elevator Co., 6 T.C. 1i58 (1946).
-7 Note 5 supra.
18 There may be some question as to the usefulness of a risk test. Under the Court Holding
Co. decision a taxpayer-shareholder may avoid a double tax so long as negotiations with
a specific purchaser have not been instituted prior to liquidation. Often, risk in the sense
of marketability of the assets can be almost completely eliminated, particularly in the case of
a closely-held concern, by a general market analysis undertaken by the shareholder while
the corporation still holds the assets.
"9 157 F. 2d 321 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946), cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 193 (1946). For a discussion of the
case see Double Taxation upon Sale of Corporate Assets, 56 Yale L.J. 379 (I947).
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the vessel was not accepted until the ship could be transferred from the sub-
sidiary and the parent could be authorized by its directors to sell the assets
received in the liquidation. Then the offer was accepted and the purchaser
received title to the property. The remainder of the assets of the subsidiary,
consisting of cash and receivables, were transferred to the parent three months
later. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a deficiency assessment
against the subsidiary based upon the gain realized from the sale of the vessel.
The taxpayer claimed that the parent had received the ship in compliance o
with Section 112(b) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that "No
gain or loss shall be recognized upon the receipt by a corporation of property
distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation."21 The Tax Court,
relying on the Court Holding Co. case, held that the parent had been a mere
conduit for the passage of title and that the subsidiary could not be disregarded
for the sole purpose of tax avoidance.22 Although affirming this decision, the
Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through judge Learned Hand, rejected the
reasoning of the Tax Court. Probably due to the careful efforts of the taxpayer's
counsel, it was clear that the negotiations for the sale of the vessel in the Fair-
field case were at all times on behalf of the parent corporation, not the sub-
sidiary. It was impossible to find, as was found in the Court Holding Co. case,
that the liquidation was in the nature of an afterthought.
The parent corporation in the Fairfield case satisfied a real-party-in-interest
requirement by conducting the entire course of negotiation in its own name.
But it did not meet the requirements of an assumption-of-risk test because the
negotiations for the sale of the assets were begun prior to liquidation. The
Court Holding Co. decision apparently demanded the satisfaction of both tests.
Superficially, the Fairfield result, which frustrated the taxpayer's attempt to
avoid a multiple tax,2 3 was consistent with the Court Holding Co. opinion since
only one of the tests was satisfied. But the appellate court expressly rejected the
Court Holding Co. decision as precedent. It follows that the court regarded an
assumption-of-risk test as immaterial. The resulting interpretation of the Court
Holding Co. decision limited its force to a real-party-in-interest requirement.
The Fairfield opinion illustrates the confusion in this portion of the tax law,
since the decision which apparently operates against taxpayers as a class may
in the long run be recognized as a substantial victory for them.
The Fairfield decision was based upon a "continuity of business" test ap-
20 Note 24 infra.
" Internal Revenue Code, § 112(b) (6), 49 Stat. 1679 (193 6), 26 U.S.C.A. § z12(b)(6) (I945).
- 5 T.C. 566 (1945).
23 In addition, the taxpayer here, as well as in the Court Holding Co. case, may have been
attempting to obtain the capital gains benefits available to shareholders as individuals-
benefits then unavailable to corporate taxpayers under the pre-1942 law which was applicable
in both of these cases. Corporations were not given the principal benefits of the capital gains
provisions until 1942, 56 Stat. 843 (1942), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117 (945). They have been available
to individuals since 1938. 52 Stat. 5oo (1938), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117 (i945).
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plicable only to parent-subsidiary liquidations under Section I12(b) (6) of the
Internal Revenue Code. The Circuit Court of Appeals found that the transfer
to the parent company had not been a liquidation within Section 112(b) (6) be-
cause that section "has its reason and its justification in the fact that
excepted transfers are of a kind which do not result in substantial
changes of interest, and that the original business is to go along as before. '2 4
Since the parent company sold the ship after receiving it in liquidation, the
court found that it had not intended to continue the business but rather had
occupied the position of a trustee in liquidation for the subsidiary.25 Therefore,
gain on the sale was attributable to the subsidiary.2'
A "continuity of business" test is supported by related tests developed in
corporate reorganization cases.2 7 But the purpose of the r~organization pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code is to "permit corporate readjustments
which otherwise would have been deterred by the imposition of taxes which
appear to the business man to be oppressive and premature,'12 and the problem
of the courts has been, generally, to prevent a tax-free distribution of profits in
the guise of a particular liquidation of assets on reorganization. In the Fairfield
case, the subsidiary was completely liquidated. The transaction could have been
recognized simply as a disposal by the shareholders of the assets of a family
24 157 F. 2d 321, 323 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
25 In an addendum, the Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to reinforce its opinion based
upon § 12(b) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code by stating that the parent company also acted
as a trustee in dissolution for its subsidiary-therefore a gain was realized by the subsidiary.
The court did not retract its original error of relying upon § 112(b) (6). That section postpones
realization of gain by the recipient of a liquidation in kind until sale to a third party. It does
not deal with problems of gain to the liquidating corporation. And the Fairfield Company was
the liquidating corporation. See Double Taxation upon Sale of Corporate Assets, 56 Yale
L.J. 379, 382 (1947); Tax Notes, 32 A.B.A.J. 516 (1946). The trusteeship argument in the
addendum only added to the confusion. The language quoted by the court from Regulation
103, § 19.22(a)-2I (i94o) concerns realization of gain in a statutory liquidation. The Fairfield
case involved a liquidation in kind. It could have been regarded as a statutory liquidation by
an application of the Court Holding Co. line of reasoning. But the addendum did not retract
the court's earlier refusal to apply that case. And the addendum gave no other clue as to how
a liquidation in kind, which in some unexplained, chameleon-like fashion suddenly became a
statutory liquidation, could by application of § I12(b)(6) create a realized gain to a liquidated
corporation.
26 The Court's use of § 112(b)(6) seems technically faulty. The section deals with a gains
tax levied upon a parent corporation. It does not apply to taxation of a subsidiary nor does
it deal with ascertaining parties to the sale of assets. No question of a tax on the parent was
before the court in the Fairfield case.
27 Fahey, Income Tax Definition of "Reorganization," 39 Col. L. Rev. 933 (i939); Parent-
Subsidiary Problem under the Non-recognition Provisions, 3 4 Ill. L. Rev. 303 (I939). Courts
are not unanimous in requiring satisfaction of a continuity-of-business test in § z12(b)(6)
situations. Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 146 F. 2d 970 (C.C.A. 6th, 1945). In the
Tri-Lakes case the subsidiary was liquidated and a tax was paid by it on the gain realized
from the conversion of the assets. The money was then transferred to the parent, the court
ruling that this transfer was tax-free under the provision of § i2(b)(6). Clearly there was no
continuity of business here.
2s Fahey, op. cit. supra note 27, at 934.
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holding company system and the parent company, as an intermediate corporate
entity, could have been disregarded. If the taxpayer had succeeded in complying
with Section I12(b)(6), only the shareholders would have been taxed upon the
gain. The effect of the decision is to require a triple tax. The subsidiary must
pay a capital gains tax, the parent is similarly taxed, and the shareholders are
taxed again either upon dividends or upon property received in liquidation, al-
though in the Fairfield case the tax to the parent was completely offset by
capital losses sustained during the year.
A principal difficulty with the opinion, one that frequently appears in tax-
avoidance decisions, is that the taxpayer may have legitimately achieved the
results in other ways. The parent might have transferred the subsidiary's shares
to the purchaser directly, although such a solution would have involved the
purchaser's willingness to pay also for assets other than the ship. An alternative
method would have been to liquidate the subsidiary before negotiations for the
sale, subject to the risk that a purchaser might not have been found. This ele-
ment of risk, however, may have been more formal than real since, at the time
of the negotiations, ships were highly marketable assets.
The Fairfield decision may tend to encourage devious solutions to liquidation
problems, such as the maintenance of secrecy or informality in negotiations.
Moreover, the tax bar may not unreasonably assume that the decision was
governed by the more technical aspects of the transaction, such as the failure to
transfer the remaining assets of the subsidiary at the same time as the vessel.
The result of such emphasis on formalities may be the limiting of tax advantages
to those able to afford higher-priced legal advice.
While the Fairfield decision appears to have substantially limited the effect of
the Court Holding Co. case by requiring only that the shareholder conduct nego-
tiations in its own name, a recent Tax Court decision, Acampo Winery & Distil-
leries v. Com'r of Int. Rev.,29 appears to have substantially eliminated even this
requirement. In the Acampo case, it was impossible to find purchasers for the
shares of the company although there was a good market for its assets. The
corporation would not sell the assets directly because of the very large tax
liability which would result, so it was decided to make a distribution in kind.
Because many of the 318 shareholders were in the armed forces or otherwise
unable to participate in person, the distribution was made to trustees acting for
them. After the corporate distribution, the trustees sold the assets to a pur-
chaser whose offer had previously been rejected by the corporation. The court
denied the applicability of the Court Holding Co. case, finding that "the negotia-
tions which led to the sale in the present case were begun after the liquidating
distribution, were carried on by trustees selected by and representing only
stockholders, were not participated in by the corporation in any way, and had
no important connection with any prior negotiations."13o The risk of devaluation
was borne by the shareholders after they paid any capital gains taxes arising
2' 7 T.C. 629 (1946). 30 Ibid., at 635.
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out of the liquidation, although such risk may have been insignificant, as it was
in the Fairfield situation, in view of the ready market existing for the assets.
The Acampo decision is significant in extending the trustee device to liquida-
tions in kind. Some earlier decisions in the lower federal courts had found that
trustees in liquidation could act for the shareholders rather than the corpora-
tion.3" But most of these cases involved closely-held companies. The Acampo
case was the first in which a court has recognized that trustees in liquidation act-
ing for many shareholders were engaged in a bona fide business arrangement
instead of a technical transaction devised solely for tax-avoidance purposes.32
If the Acampo case is followed, corporate owners may avoid the double taxation
incident to dissolution through trustees for the corporation while retaining the
advantages of a centralized liquidation. The practical problem in taking ad-
vantage of the decision arises in arranging the transfer so as to establish the
shareholders rather than the corporation as the beneficiaries of the trusteeship
in liquidation. Apparently the retention by the corporation of sufficient assets
to meet outstanding obligations, pay taxes, and cover the expenses of winding
up was sufficient in the Acampo case to satisfy any real-party-in-interest require-
ment.33
The irreconcilable difference in treatment between a statutory liquidation
and a sale of shares does not contribute to the formation of desirable tax law.
But the position of a liquidation in kind, vacillating between the two extremes,
reduces the disinvestment problem to complete confusion. A consistent treat-
ment of the liquidation-in-kind situations may effect a workable result. One
solution, indicated by the Fairfield and Acampo cases, would permit a share-
holder in most situations to obtain the advantages of centralized and flexible
liquidation while at the same time avoiding a double assessment. The share-
holder would only be required to satisfy the simple requirements of the Acampo
case in order to achieve a single tax. Such a solution would, as a practical
31 Weeks v. Sibley, 269 Fed. i55 (D.C. Tex., 1920); Conservative Gas Co., 30 B.T.A. 552
(1934); see also Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Merchants Nat'l Bldg. Corp., 131 F. 2d 740, 74 (C.C.A.
5th, 1942); Central Nat'l Bank, 25 B.T.A. 1123, 1128 (1932); Jemison's Appeal, 3 B.T.A. 780,
803 (1926).
32 Since a large number of shareholders were involved in the Acampo case, it is possible to
minimize the importance of the decision. The strict judicial attitude in liquidation cases
toward an avoidance of a corporate tax is usually manifested where a closely-held corporation
is involved. The high degree of individual shareholder control present in such situations may
raise an "unofficial" presumption of unwarranted tax-avoidance. Unquestionably, such a con-
sideration cannot be completely ignored in tax cases. Nevertheless, the courts tend to empha-
size the facts indicating the presence or absence of an agency or trust relationship between the
shareholders and the trustees in liquidation. See Trippett v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 118 F. 2d
764, 765 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941); First Nat'l Bank of Greeley v. United States, 86 F. 2d 938, 941
(C.C.A. ioth, 1936); Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 47 F. 2d io8, ro9 (C.C.A.
5th, 1931); First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 3 T.C. 203, 216 (1944).
From the agency standpoint, the Acampo case assumes considerable significance. It is far
easier to find an agency relationship where there are few shareholders than where there are
many.
3' 7 T.C. 629, 636 (1946).
NOTES
matter, render obsolete the provisions relating to statutory liquidations through
trustees for the corporation.34
An alternative solution based upon the Court Holding Co. decision is also
feasible although it cannot affect the single-tax feature of the sale-of-shares
device. By a drastic extension of that case, a double tax could be required
whenever the corporation is a party to the sale negotiations in any capacity.
Some degree of uncertainty may be created concerning the presence of the
corporation in the transaction, but the practical effect of this uncertainty may be
at least partially eliminated by placing the burden of persuasion as to this issue
on the corporation.
Uniformity in all disinvestment situations, regardless of the method em-
ployed by the shareholders, could be achieved in the way of a single tax by a
legislative change which would abolish any tax to the corporation upon statu-
tory liquidation. But such a solution raises the entire question of taxes upon
corporate income and for that reason the legislature might be reluctant to per-
mit the necessary change.
To an equal extent, uniformity could be achieved if gain upon appreciated
assets were recognized by the tax system as realized whenever the corporation
disposed of the assets by sale, exchange, or liquidation. If this were the law, a
double tax3s would result whenever shareholders disinvested and liquidated a
corporation. The Internal Revenue Code today clearly requires a double tax in
the case of a statutory liquidation.36 A double tax would also result in the liqui-
dation-in-kind situation if the law were changed to recognize a taxable gain to
the corporation upon disposal of its assets. The present Treasury Regulation,
which provides that no gain is realized by a corporation upon assets liquidated in
kind, is consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Court expressed in a
decision dealing with dividend distributions in kind. In that case, General
Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,37 the corporation did not realize any gain
upon distribution of the dividend in kind38 because the corporation was not
34 There is a strong possibility that the rationale of the Acampo decision, permitting trus-
tees to act for the shareholders rather than for the corporation, would not survive an attempt
to create a generally available single-tax liquidation device. Such an attempt might be pre-
vented by courts which considered that the trusteeship for stockholders would not preclude
simultaneous trusteeship for the corporation. See Chilhowee Mills, Inc. v. Com'r of Int. Rev.,
4 T.C. 558, 566 (i945); Will T. Caswell v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 36 B.T.A. 816, 822 (i937).
3s The term "double tax" does not necessarily indicate a simultaneous assessment against
two tax-paying entities as a result of a single transaction, but rather, the term is used to indi-
cate the combined effect of an assessment against shareholders for all gains received upon
disinvestment coupled with a gains tax to the corporation levied upon the disposition of
appreciated property at any time during the corporate existence.
36 Note 2 supra. 37 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
38 It is difficult to reconcile this decision with the Court Holding Co. opinion. In the
General Utilities case, the taxpayer corporation refused to sell assets because of the gains
tax to the corporation. But the corporation officials negotiated with the prospective purchaser
and agreed to terms for the sale. The corporation distributed the assets as a dividend in kind
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
selling its assets nor exchanging them as payment for a corporate debt.39 A
rescission of the present Treasury Regulation accompanied by judicial or legis-
lative reversal of the General Utilities doctrine as applied to liquidations in kind
would be necessary in order to impose a double tax.
In the sale-of-shares situation it would not be necessary to tax the corpora-
tion immediately at the time the shareholders dispose of their interests. Dis-
solution of the corporation does not necessarily accompany disinvestment by
the shareholders as it must in the statutory-liquidation and liquidation-in-kind
situations. In the sale-of-shares situation a double tax is imposed if the cor-
poration is ultimately taxed upon the gain even though the assessment is not
made until final dissolution. Final dissolution must be accompanied by a statu-
tory liquidation or by a liquidation in kind. Only if the General Utilities doc-
trine is rejected will the liquidation in kind result in a double tax as does the
statutory liquidation. But a further change in the present tax law would be
necessary to make the tax upon dissolution inescapable. The corporation's basis
for any assets held by it would have to remain unaffected by the basis acquired
by the purchasing shareholders. The tax-free alteration of basis for corporate
assets to conform with share purchase price, as sometimes permitted today,
would provide a continuing loophole for avoidance of a gains tax upon disposal
of the assets by the corporation.4o
to its stockholders who sold to the same purchaser on terms identical with those of the earlier
agreement. And the court rejected the Commissioner's claim for a gains tax on the corpora-
tion. The Court Holding Co. opinion did not mention the General Utilities decision, much less
overrule it, despite the fact that the two cases reached opposite results in situations dis-
tinguishable only on the ground that one dealt with liquidations in kind and the other with
dividends in kind.
39 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (i935). The court
distinguished the situation in which the corporation declares a cash dividend and pays it
through a distribution of appreciated assets. In this situation the corporation realizes a gain
upon distribution since it is paying a corporate debt at the appreciated rate. Interstate Realty
Co. v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 25 B.T.A. 728 (i932); Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co., 2o B.T.A.
556 (193o).
40 Under the law today, the purchaser of a corporation by use of the sale-of-shares device
may enable the company to escape taxation for appreciation of the corporate assets, and at the
same time he may acquire a new corporate basis for the assets equal to the share purchase
price. The purchaser of the shares will immediately transfer all corporate assets to himself
by use of a liquidation in kind. No capital gains tax will be incurred upon the transfer, since
no gain is realized by the corporation upon a liquidation in kind, and no gain will be realized
by the shareholder since purchase price of the shares presumably will equal current market
value of the assets. The shareholder will reincorporate, transferring the assets to the new
corporation in return for stock valued at the purchase price of the old corporation shares.
As a result, the basis of the assets to the new corporation for gain and loss purposes will be
the appreciated value, yet the gain will have completely escaped corporate taxation. Even
apart from the method just outlined, the same result may be achieved directly according to
one circuit court decision which held that the purchaser of shares who is really purchasing the
assets of an entire corporation may obtain a new basis for the assets equal to the purchase
price of the shares. Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Ashland Oil and Refining Co., 99 F. 2d 588 (C.C.A.
6th, 1938).
NOTES
The obvious difficulty with the uniform-double-tax solution just presented is
that the General Utilities doctrine4' follows the accepted practice of the present
tax system in adopting a conservative notion of what constitutes realization of
gain.42 Moreover, it may be undesirable to provide for a double tax in the sale-
of-shares situation if such a solution requires the retention of the original basis
for the corporate assets in the face of a greatly disparate sales price paid by the
purchasing shareholders.
Regardless of the theoretical reasoning that may support it, the difference in
treatment of a statutory liquidation, a sale of shares, and a liquidation in kind
seems undesirable, as evidenced by the confusion in the Fairfield opinion. From
a taxpayer's standpoint, a disinvestment, regardless of the method used in its
accomplishment, represents a single decision to withdraw from a business. Per-
haps in other areas of the tax law, reasons exist which justify treating uniform
business decisions differently as the methods employed vary. But there are no
apparent reasons compelling the lack of uniformity in treatment accorded dis-
investment transactions.
41 The Supreme Court in the General Utilities case had no difficulty in refusing to recog-
nize a taxable gain to the corporation realized upon the dividend in kind. Such an attitude is
surprising in view of the ill-concealed horror with which the court viewed the actions of the
taxpayer in the Court Holding Co. opinion. Upon facts strikingly similar to those of the
General Utilities case, the Court held that the corporation realized a gain when it liquidated in
kind to its shareholders. See note 38 supra.
42 For a discussion and criticism of the standard concepts of realization of gain see Simons,
Personal Income Taxation (1938).
